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And I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth are 
passed away: and the sea is no more.  
- Revelations v.1. 
 
The 1980s was a time of incredible political ferment in South Africa. Student protests, 
consumer boycotts of white businesses in small towns across the hinterland and consolidation of 
the union movement raised the specter of not only the defeat of apartheid but the radical re-
structuring of the South African economy. As Colin Bundy reflected:  
 
Between the Durban strikes of 1973 and the Mass Democratic Movement’s (MDM) 
defiance campaign of 1989, a long wave of popular protest surged across the South 
African political landscape. It eroded familiar landmarks and opened new channels, it 
lapped on the beachheads of white power, and its high tide left a residue of aspirations 
and expectations (Bundy 2000, 26).  
 
For many, the un-banning of the liberation movements and the release of Nelson Mandela 
was a sign that these expectations were closer than ever. The first utterances of Mandela and his 
policy pronouncements stimulated the sense that the aspirations that fueled the rebellion against 
apartheid were on course. Mandela’s first speech on his release from prison paid allegiance to the 
fundamental tenets of the Freedom Charter (Sampson 1999). But, with Mandela’s stirring words 
on his release from prison still ringing in our ears, a counter-move was already gaining ground.  
 
The African National Congress (ANC) came to power when the global terrain had 
changed dramatically. Most significantly, the Soviet Union had collapsed and historians were 
heralding the “end of history”, with capitalism as the only viable alternative (Fukuyama 1992). 
This was the position taken by those wielding power in post-apartheid South Africa. Mandela 
returned from Davos in Switzerland in 1992 to announce to his closest aides: “Chaps, we have to 
choose. We either keep nationalization and get no investment, or we modify our own attitude and 
get investment” (Sampson 1999, 435). In 1994, Mandela in a speech to the joint session of the 
Houses of Congress in Washington, spoke of the free market as a “magic elixir” (Saul 2011: 8).  
It was a magical turnaround for both its speed and commitment to the new road.   
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These developments were hailed as a ‘miracle’. As John Saul laconically reflects, 
“Entirely submissive and market-friendly initiatives” were written about “as novel and daring 
departures” (Saul 2002, 43-44).  
 
The rump of the hegemonic narrative was that all ideological questions had been settled 
in history. The success of nations now rested on how they positioned themselves to lap up the 
flows of foreign investment. Would they be capitalist tigers or protectionist dodos? South Africa 
chose to be a capitalist tiger released from the iron cage of apartheid and ready to do battle on the 
global market.      
 
A high-ranking former member of Mandela’s first cabinet, Ronnie Kasrils, recently 
reflected on ANC economic policy in Faustian terms.   
 
What I call our Faustian moment came when [South Africa] took an IMF loan on the eve 
of our first democratic election. That loan, with strings attached that precluded a radical 
economic agenda, was considered a necessary evil (Kasrils 2013). 
 
What Kasrils refers to are the huge debts that the apartheid government had run up and 
the need for cash to tide the new government over while it settled into office. Although not 
formally in power, the ANC was consulted about the terms of government borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). It consented and signed off. 
 
Doubt had come to reign supreme: we believed, wrongly, there was no other option; that 
we had to be cautious, since by 1991 our once powerful ally, the Soviet Union, 
bankrupted by the arms race, had collapsed. Inexcusably, we had lost faith in the ability 
of our own revolutionary masses to overcome all obstacles (Kasrils 2013). 
 
These words by Kasrils, former Minister of Intelligence in the ANC post-apartheid 
government, were penned in June 2013. While there had already been strident critiques of the 
ANC government, these words, coming from the ultimate insider, were a revelation to many.  
 
The parable of Faust is exactly that, selling your soul to attain short-term satisfaction; 
riches, fame, pleasure. However, the devil always comes to collect at some point down the line 
and the price is terrible and eternal.  
 
At first, the concessions that Kasrils points to did not seem to be dramatic. It was just one 
loan. It came in useful and the markets were satisfied that the ANC was not going to renege on 
paying the odious debt of the previous government. The ANC duly swept to power in 1994 and 
with the world watching, Nelson Mandela was inaugurated as the first President of a democratic 
South Africa. It was expected that democracy would bring its own dividends to be shared fairly 
among all South Africa’s people. But, as time would show, this loan was the beginning, not only 
of the acceptance, but the embrace of a very damaging economic logic.  
 
Before the elections, the ANC unveiled the Reconstruction and Development 
Programmeor RDP (ANC 1994). Whatever its shortcomings, the RDP was caucused among its 
Alliance partners, COSATU and the SACP. It proposed a different and ambitious ideology of 
development to the top-down approach of the apartheid era. At the centre of this approach was a 
‘people-driven’ process: 
 
…. The RDP integrates growth, development, reconstruction and redistribution into a 
unified programme. The key to this link is an infrastructural programme that will provide 
access to modern and effective services like electricity, water, telecommunications, 
transport, health, education, and training for all our people (ANC 1994, 6). 
 
However, the twinning of infrastructural development with reconstruction and redistribution was 
soon to run into problems. The waterpipes could be laid in areas that had never enjoyed water 
before, but who was going to pay for those services thereafter?  The user of course.  The user-
pay idea was, in turn, connected to the need to service debt. At the same time, the amount of 
development of infrastructure that could take place was limited by the injunctions of the 
Washington Consensus: place emphasis onfiscal discipline and good things will automatically 
happen to your economy. 
 
With the imposition of Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR),the 
compromises that Kasrils talked about became much more apparent. Although posing as a 
continuation of the RDP, GEAR’s neo-liberal underpinnings as proposed by the IMF in its 
structural adjustment programs were quite obvious (MacDonald, 2004). While the RDP put at its 
centre the creation of jobs as the catalyst for restructuring the economy and delivering 
development, GEAR placed growth as the ruling mantra, the ‘trickle-down approach.’ Key 
strategies became to curtail inflation, improve competitiveness, encourage investment and 
drastically reduce the budget deficit. 
 
Crucially, the RDP talked about “the full participation of civil society, together with 
Government, in order to find ways to take down the barriers which emerge during the course of 
the RDP” (1994, 41). But as MacDonald points out: 
 
...because GEAR was suspected to be anathema to core ANC constituencies, it had to be 
imposed summarily and peremptorily, as Mbeki and Mandela had done.And because it 
could not be sustained consensually and democratically...Civil society had to be kept at 
bay, and unresponsive party apparatuses had to be maintained. Paradoxically, popular 
dissatisfaction with GEAR favours more centralisation and less accountability (2004, 
645). 
 
 
Modernization takes hold 
 
The first economy is the modern industrial, mining, agricultural, financial, and services 
sector of our economy that, everyday, become ever more integrated in the global 
economy. Many of the major interventions made by our government over the years have 
sought to address this ‘first world economy’, to ensure that it develops in the right 
direction, at the right pace... the successes we have scored with regard to the ‘first world 
economy’ also give us the possibility to attend to the problems posed by the ‘third world 
economy’, which exists side by side with the modern ‘first world economy’… Of central 
and strategic importance is the fact that they are structurally disconnected from our 
country’s ‘first world economy’. Accordingly, the interventions we make with regard to 
this latter economy do not necessarily impact on these areas, the ‘third world economy’, 
in a beneficial manner’ (Mbeki 2003). 
 
Former President Thabo Mbeki defined South Africa in terms of a first and second 
economy. Mbeki argued that the solution depended upon tweaking the neoliberal approach. For 
Mbeki, “those who benefit from the growth and development of the ‘first world economy’ will 
benefit even more from its expansion, resulting from the development of the ‘third world 
economy’ to the point that its loses its ‘third world’ character and becomes part of the ‘first 
world economy’”.  
 
Inscribed in the idea of the second economy being absorbed by the first is, simply, old-
fashioned modernization theory. Instead of distributing social goods by means other than the 
market (or imposing the sort of serious social and regulatory constraints on the profit motive that 
even Adam Smith had in mind) so as to integrate the two economies, Mbeki’s apparent task was 
simply to complete the modernization process.  
 
But this is a version of the old Rostowian model in which Europe was what Africa should 
be judged by. Europe was the future (1960). For Mbeki, this Rostowian model was repackaged, 
giving South Africa an internal modernization project of a special type, in which the first 
economy (Europe) is the ideal. However, this idea lacks any understanding of how the first 
economy is predicated on the underdevelopment of the second.  
 
Economist SampieTerreblanche holds that Mbeki’s admission that there was no staircase 
between the first and second economy grants  
 
that the ‘trickle down’ effect is nothing but a myth…The acknowledgement that the 
government will have to play an entrepreneurial role in the ‘second economy’ is rather 
promising. Unfortunately, the government’s ability to intervene in the ‘second economy’ 
is very much hampered by the lack of capacity in the public sector. But what is perhaps 
of greater importance, is that it will become contra-productive to intervene in the ‘second 
economy’ while the ‘structure’, the macroeconomic policy and the neo-liberal privileges 
granted to the corporate sector remain intact in the ‘first economy’. It is highly necessary 
to move towards a truly developmental state system in South Africa. But this cannot be 
created in the second economy only. It will have to be created in the South African 
economy as an undivided entity (2010, 10). 
 
For Andries du Toit, the idea of two economies existing alongside each other  
 
does not capture the complex actual relationships that do exist between the wealthy core 
of the South African economy and its underdeveloped and impoverished periphery. 
Shack dwellers in Khayelitsha, seasonal workers in Ceres and villagers in Mount Frere 
cannot be meaningfully described as being ‘disconnected’ from the South African 
economy. Their impoverishment, on the contrary, is directly related to the dynamics of 
150 or more years of forcible incorporation into racialised capitalism; on disadvantageous 
terms. Indeed, it may well be that many of the obstacles to accumulation from below 
among poor people are at present linked to the depth of corporate penetration of the 
South African economy as a whole. The issue is not that there are ‘not enough linkages’ 
but the nature of those linkages, and the extent to which they serve either to empower 
poor people or simply to allow money to be squeezed out of them (2004, 29-30).    
 
These critiques were overwhelmed by the idea of a headlong dash into the first economy 
and the first world.  One is reminded here of Plekhanov’s assurance: “We, indeed, know our way 
and are seated in that historical train which at full speed takes us to our goal” (in Leslie 2000, 
174).   
 
It is a matter of history that Mbeki, accused by opponents within the ANC and SACP of 
advancing a pro-capitalist class project, did not serve out his second term as President (Gevisser, 
2009). He was replaced by a man, Jacob Zuma, who had all the form of being a man of the 
people. But Mbeki’s economic substance went unchanged. Government’s role in bringing about 
change was to create an environment for jobs. With the world financial crisis causing a coyness 
in employers hiring staff, the state had to take the lead. This did not mean that nationalization 
was flirted with again. Rather, it meant state funding and huge infrastructure projects with the 
private sector being engaged to complete them. A private sector, it is necessary to point out, that 
had to show a commitment to ‘transformation’ to win these giant tenders. In practice, this meant 
the inclusion of an essentially parasitic consortium of black influence peddlers dressed up as 
business partners attached to white capital with the networks to price fix where they could not 
monopolize tenders.   
 
So we had the Gautrain, 2010 World Cup stadia, the industrial complex at Coega, the 
world’s third and fourth-largest coal-fired electricity generators (Kusile and Medupi), mega-
dams, and expansions to airports, ports, roads, and pipelines.  
 
More recently, the National Development Plan named South Durban as its second 
highest-priority mega-project (after the Waterberg-Richards Bay coal infrastructure expansion). 
This project will put tens of thousands on the move and change the landscape of the city 
dramatically. This project falls under the Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission 
(PICC) projects.  
 
President Jacob Zuma (2014) offered this rationale for the projects:  
 
At the close of the second decade of our democracy, it is clear that we need to change 
gear. All South Africans need to work together in a concerted effort to improve service 
delivery, bolster job creation and expedite economic transformation. In South Africa, 
joblessness is still unacceptably high even with recent growth in job numbers. Global 
economic prospects remain fragile. In response, the Government of the Republic of South 
Africa has taken a bold decision. We have chosen a path of counter-cyclical spending 
driven by catalytic infrastructure investment. We are striking a fine balance between 
protecting our sovereign integrity while leveraging the multiplier impact of fixed capital 
formation. Valuable lessons have been learned from our most recent building 
programmes, such as the 2010 World Cup stadiums, King Shaka International Airport, 
Medupi Power Station and Gautrain(Zuma 2014).  
 
In the run-up to the May 2014 national elections, then Public Enterprise Minister 
MalusiGigaba held that infrastructure investment of $380 billion would be the catalyst of 
“radical socioeconomic transformation”, de-racialising and broadening ownership, heralding 
“inclusive and equitable growth” and “millions of sustainable and decent jobs” (Gigaba 2014). 
 
As is the case in these top-down projects, there are no details provided as to how the 
expansion of the Port will translate into a “radical socioeconomic transformation.” What is 
important to note is that state investment will be used to ‘de-racialise’ ownership through Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE), what MacDonald has called “racial nationalist empowerment” 
which represents a marked shift from the orientation of the RDP: 
 
Where the RDP implied skepticism towards business, BEE implied cooperation; where 
the RDP pursued economic equality as its objective, BEE valued racial empowerment; 
and where the RDP took economic interests as axes of organisation, BEE used racial 
identities to stabilize capitalism. By the logic of BEE, the bourgeoisie legitimated itself as 
a class through its African faction, a valuable contribution to tendencies in the ANC that 
celebrate capitalism (MacDonald 2004, 649). 
 
It is against the backdrop of the turn from RDP to GEAR, the rise of BEE hanging onto 
the coat-tails of white capital, the emphasis on the first economy and the idea of mega-projects 
imposed from the top that one needs to take cognizance of in understanding the arrival of 
Faustian development to the South Basin.   
 
 
‘All Things New’ 
 
The space of capital accumulation thus gradually came to life, and began to be fitted out 
(Lefebvre1991, 275). 
 
The landscape of the city of Durban is set to change dramatically by 2040. The 
government has set in motion plans for $25 billion in new port and petrochemical investments. 
The end result will mean that Sub-Saharan Africa’s largest port in South Durban, which in 2012 
handled 2.5 million containers, will increase its load to 20 million containers annually.  
 
It is here that Kasrils notion of the Faustian bargain, hammered out between 1990 and 
1994, meets Faustian development.  
 
Goethe’s Faust, written at the beginning of the 19th century, is one of those timeless 
classics. Faust is famous for making a pact with the Devil; “a life of limitless wealth and 
pleasure” in return for his soul for eternity. What this means in real terms is revealed in the 
fascinating and tragic story of Faust’s drive to capture the high seas, because they spread 
barrenness. Faust became obsessed with trying to wage war against the sea, to “lock the 
imperious ocean from the coast”(Goethe 1986, 10233).2 
 
In this quest, he simply turned his eyes away from the odious results. With his project of 
grabbing from the sea ‘hospitable’ land completed, Faust remained unhappy. An old couple, 
Philemon and Baucis’s small piece of land, blocked the view of his accomplishment. Faust was 
angry because “the linden grove, its old brown cottage and the dilapidated chapel are not 
mine”(11157-58). They refused to yield to Faust even though he offered them money and a 
mansion elsewhere. Faust, like the modern day proponents of consultation and due process, felt 
he had done enough: “Resistance and obstinacy/ Thwart the most glorious success, / Till in the 
end, to one's disgust, /One soon grows tired of being just”(11269-72). 
 
Mephisto stepped in and goaded: “Why scruple at this late hour?” Faust responded by 
instructing Mephisto to “clear them out of my way” (11275).Mephisto swept down upon the old 
couple’s house. When Faust inquired what happened, he was told that the house had burned 
down and the couple had perished in the fire.  
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Faust was aghast. But he soon recovered. He had many more projects to prosecute. He 
could hardly be expected to allow an old couple’s shack to stand in his way. 
 
In June 2014, I went to the Clairwood Racecoursein the South Basin and thought about 
the Faustian pact that raises so many questions about development; about the destruction of 
nature, ecosystems and ways of living without any form of accounting. Development for 
developmentsake. Unlike the new high-tech racecourses, Clairwoodretains much of the 
architecture and feel of a by-gone era. In the centre and all around is a beautiful wetland which 
stands in visceral contrast to the smoke-laden air that engulfs the valley on the other side of the 
Freeway.  
 
I wondered whether the race-goers knew that the racecourse would soon be part of 
history. The area has been sold to developers who are planning a logistics park. It is part of a 
R250 billion development that will see a gigantic dug-out port envelop the area. 
 
The Racecourse is a vital green lung in an area that has been referred to as ‘Cancer 
Alley’. As the South Durban Community EnvironmentalAlliance (SDCEA) points out, 
theracecourseis home to rare bird species such as crowned cranes and black storks and 
importantly, it is the only home to the Racecourse Lily (Kniphofiapauciflora). They will all be no 
more once the thousands of trucks,forklifts and warehouses make their appearance in and around 
the logistics park (SDCEA 2014).  
 
In this quest, thousands of people will be uprooted from their homes and put on the move. 
The sandbanks that give protection and the mangrove swamps will disappear and so will the 
natural filters that allow some breathing space in South Durban.   
 
‘We need the new dug out port’ is the mantra of government and big capital. But the 
figures that emanate from Transnet itself do nothing to substantiate this argument. As it stands, 
Durban’s processing cost per container is the highest in the world. How will investing R250 
billion make the port more competitive? In fact, if one factors in paying the interest on money 
borrowed and all the new expenditure, the prognosis is that Durban will price itself out of the 
market (Dyer 2014). Once more, like King Shaka airport, Moses Mabhida stadium and the 
International Convention Centre, ratepayers will have to make up the shortfall for massively 
under-utilized, vanity infrastructure whose chief benefit is to those who get the contracts to build 
them and the political class who serve as ‘business partners’.  
 
Journalist Terry Hutson(2014) has pointed out that not long ago, the port dropped 
approximately 200 00 TEU (a TEU being the equivalent of a 6m container) in a year and there 
has not been much growth since. Small changes like upgrading rail infrastructure, for example, 
would make a huge difference to facilitate cargo through the congestion. The commitment to 
make a more efficient existing port would also enable Durban to meet changing needs. In the 
context of the upgrading and competitiveness of African ports, there is a serious danger of 
overcapacity in all the new berths.Figures from 2012 cited that Durban was the most expensive 
port in the world with costs per average container ship nearlyfive times higher than the world 
average(Dyer 2014).The risk is real. Durban’s dug-out port could easily be, like Coega in the 
Eastern Cape, another ghost port of call.  
 
Transnet has responded with the argument that this development will create 130 000 
permanent jobs (SDCEA 2014). We know in the era of global economic volatility that this is a 
thumb-suck. Even if this fantastical figure were reached, it turns on capital investment of R1.9m 
per job. With this kind of investment, all manner of other job creation projects could just as well 
be funded.  
 
Ronnie Kasrils tells us that the ANC lived through a Faustian moment in 1994 and that it 
has haunted South Africa’s post-apartheid social policy formulation ever since. The ANC 
wagered everything on putting in place economic policies that would appeal to distant investors. 
It paid back immoral debts run up by the tyranny before it. It kept social spending tight and taxes 
low. When it did spend, it did so more to satisfy the rich than the poor. In return, they wagered 
on foreign direct investment pouring in. What these policies actually garnered was insubstantial. 
For as long as it lasted, the new government was patronized as running a rare, African country 
with ‘sound’ economic policies. The foreign direct investment never came. 
 
Since the ANC’s Faustian pact, the world economic crisis of 2008 has come and 
threatens constantly to come again. Events have revealed that the Devil is, in fact, unable to 
reward governments for the sacrifice of their principles in the form of slow upliftment for the 
entire nation. The pact that the generation of Mandela and Kasrils made is no longer on offer. 
The age of developmental ‘tiger’ economies is over. Now the terms of the pact with the devil are 
more focused.   
 
Individual politicians are individually rewarded for swinging contracts the way of 
diabolical corporations. Everyone knows that the Devil does not keep long-term promises of 
general upliftment in exchange for national sacrifice. All that may be safely exchanged these 
days is enormous personal wealth for enormous personal corruption. And this is what lies behind 
these hugely profitable but unnecessary construction projects under President Zuma. It is not a 
macro-economic gamble, nor even a toying with the terms of neo-liberalism itself. It is a way of 
diverting public funds into private hands. Construction for construction sake.Written up as being 
in the national interest and for the greater good of course. 
 
It is this that Kasrils points to in his reflections on the Faustian Moment:  
 
Whatever the threats to isolate a radicalizing South Africa, the world could not have done 
without our vast reserves of minerals. To lose our nerve was not necessary or inevitable. 
The ANC leadership needed to remain determined, united and free of corruption – and, 
above all, to hold on to its revolutionary will. Instead, we chickened out. The ANC 
leadership needed to remain steadfast in its commitment to serve the people. This would 
have given it the hegemony required not only over the entrenched capitalist class but over 
emergent elitists, many of whom would seek wealth through black economic 
empowerment, corrupt practices and the sale of political influence. 
 
Another victim of the 2008 financial crisis is the ‘science’ of economics. Revealed to 
have lacked any predictive power as well as any secure foundational principles, economics has 
entered a new age. It is a New Age of magical thinking, the equivalent of arranging crystals 
around a sick person in the hopeofdrawing in positive energies. 
 
This kind of thinking reaches its apogee in the words of Johan Van Zyl, CEO of Toyota:  
 
Durban as a brand is not strong enough to simply say ‘come and invest in Durban’. What 
it needs to attract investors is big projects. China is building ports they do not even know 
they will use. If return on investment is the line of thinking we may never see the 
infrastructure (The Mercury 8 Feb 2012). 
 
What Van Zyl does not ask, is who invests in a bankrupt, rioting city, albeit full of deep 
harbors and five lane highways? The Chinese model only has a chance of working when such a 
government runs a massive balance of payments surplus with the rest of the world. If it does not, 
then the only option is to maintain a clampdown on the discontent created by governmental 
neglect, the likes of which South Africa’s constitution and national character does not permit. 
 
Many of us grew up in households where we were warned that the ‘devil never sleeps, 
the devil’s work is never done.’ And that is the essence of Faustian development. The climactic 
clause in Faust's pact with the devil, as Marshall Berman (1988, 78) points out, is that if ever he 
stops and says to the moment, “Verweiledoch, du bistsoschoen,” (linger a while, you are so 
beautiful),he will be destroyed. This is played out to the bitter end in millions of lives every day, 
one mega-project raises the need for yet another: 
 
In the daytime noisy workmen 
Hacked and shovelled, all in vain; 
Where, at night, small fires flickered, 
There was a dam the following day. 
Human lives were sacrificed, 
Groans of torment filled the darkness (11123–8). 
 
 
Digging the Ground From Beneath Their Feet 
 
The idea of development stands today like a ruin in theintellectual landscape. Delusion 
and disappointment,failures and crimes have been the steady companions ofdevelopment 
and they tell a common story: it did notwork.... It is time to dismantle this mental 
structure (Sachs 1995, 1). 
 
In Thabo Mbeki’s world, these mega-projects, like stadiums, will suture the 
disconnection between the first and second economy. But the opposite seems to be happening. 
Resources are drained upwards with the promise that they will eventually trickle downwards.  
 
Sachs puts forward an ideological challenge. How does one start to see the economics of 
things differently?  
 
In this context, the SDCEA comments on the deepening, lengthening and widening of 
Berth 203 to 205, Pier 2, Container Terminal, and Port of Durban are very powerful in raising 
how  
 
Existing and new developments within the catchment of the Bay have cumulative impacts 
on the bay ecosystem, which are increasingly compromising the integrity of the bay and 
pushing it to the brink of collapse…  
 
SDCEA also raises the issues of the impact of rising sea levels. They quote Mather et al.:  
 
Within harbors, the extra water depth will result in less freeboard along the quayside 
resulting in more frequent wave wash/overspray onto the working area with increased 
down-time and loss of productivity. With the increased wave energy, ships moored 
alongside the quays will not be as stable as required for the offloading of cargo. This will 
result in longer off-loading times, longer ship turn-around times, inefficiency at the berth-
side and extra costs (SDCEA 2014).  
 
Patrick Bond has raised a number of further pertinent issues that Transnet has not 
factored into its EIA assessments:   
 
• by expanding the shipping capacity of Durban harbour to super post-Panamax scale 
container vessels, will Transnet take up excessive amountsof South Africa’s carbon 
budget and therefore ruin the government’s pledgeto peak and then decrease emissions 
after 2020; 
 
• expanding the shipping capacity also requires expanding the freightcapacity, the danger 
is that more emissions, congestion, and truckingrelatedaccidents will occur in an area 
demonstrably unsuitable given lackof road transport and inadequate shifting of freight to 
rail, so it is criticalto know the amount of the new freight capacity being built to handle 
themuch larger shipping capacity – i.e., what proportion of this is beinganticipated for 
freight haulage by rail and by trucking respectively? 
 
• has the recommendation by the Academy of Sciences of South Africa, inits 2011 book 
Towards a Low Carbon City, commissioned by the city,been incorporated? “The 
transport sector is pivotal to the transition to allow carbon city... The top priority was 
identified as the need to reduce thevehicle kilometers travelled in the road freight sector 
as this provided thegreatest opportunity to simultaneously reduce emissions of 
GreenHouseGases and traditional air pollutants.” 
 
• how much additional CO2 will be emitted by the bunker fuel that isconsumed by ships 
en route to and from Durban as a result of the vast newcapacity associated with super 
post-Panamax ships soon capable of enteringthe Durban harbor, and how much additional 
CO2 will be emitted by thetrucks that will haul the new freight, assuming this expansion 
is the cruciallink in raising capacity to 5 million containers annually? (Bond 2014, 486). 
 
In these times when mega-projects linger over us, as Marx put it, “like the fate of the 
ancients, and with an invisible hand allots fortune and misfortune to men”, the only way it can be 
checked is through organized political action (Marx 1978, 162). What the mobilization of 
SDCEA seeks is a Benjaminesque interruption, “the grasp for the emergency brake” to halt the 
helter-skelter that mega-projects seek to bring into train (Leslie 2000, 174).    
 
SDCEA has achieved some success in the South Basin, namely the closing down of two 
landfills which were toxic minefields, but the battle against the dug-out port is a whole new ball 
game that requires sustained political mobilization.  
 
The real test is whether SDCEA will be able to translate its scientific and human 
challenges to port extension into power on the ground. To escape the mental cage of our given 
economics that Sachs alludes to is only half the problem. On what basis does one resist the 
deleterious effects on one’s own life and livelihoods that flow from the bargains other people 
have made? Here, SDCEA faces major challenges.  
 
The challenge for those opposing the harbor expansion is how to organize on a terrain 
where the belief that mega-projects are the only way to create jobs and fire-up the economy runs 
deep? A popular beer in South Africa has branded itself as the working man’s brew. Their 
adverts show the solidarity of big industry: muscular men welding, building, saving the day 
through the sweat of their brow. There is a certain common-sense feel to this narrative. If only 
people (men?) could be put to work, society would thrive. Resistance to a big project will run 
into these subjective headwinds. 
 
The pull of the narrative is less strong even than the pull of the pay-check. Many people 
living in the South Basin are skilled but desperately unemployed artisans, sure to pick up work, 
however temporary, on the metalwork, plumbing and engineering that will go into a port 
expansion. 
 
The communities of the South Basin are tightly woven around racial identities. This is 
what makes them strong, but because of the tendency to insularity, also weak when it comes to 
confronting the social dislocations that will emerge with the dug-out port. How to keep the 
strength of community, the local networks, while building alliances that cross the old racial 
boundaries is a central challenge for activists. Then there are class interests that range from 
shack-dwellers who see relocation as a chance to jump the huge queue for houses, to owners of 
residential properties in Clairwood who have seen their market value deteriorate but are now 
faced with a once-off opportunity to cash-in. The area is further, to put it mildly, known for 
gangsterism. Any corporate interest with enough money to invest in such a project would be able 
to find ready foot-soldiers to cut-across community mobilization with violence. Remember 
Faust’s words:  
 
 Make payments, offer bonuses, conscript them!(11554-6) 
 
The option of calling for financial sanctions so that Transnet cannot raise the necessary 
funds could be a very crucial strategy (Bond 2014).But there are also negatives. It could fire up 
the racial nationalists who see this move as unpatriotic and use it to create a fifth column among 
its constituency in the South Basin. These sorts of contestations do not always get settled in 
boardrooms, but often physically. A call for sanctions could also serve to demobilize people as 
they see sanctions rather than their own power to prevent the development from spreading across 
the South Basin and drowning out their lives.  
 
There is also the issue of the “reds” and the “greens” (Death 2014). This division was 
highlighted in November 2015 when, over the same weekend, SDCEA called a meeting of 
environmentalists that stretched across class and race divides, while the National Union of 
Metalworkers (NUMSA) across town called a meeting of community movements to discuss the 
building of a United Front. Despite appeals to SDCEA to postpone their meeting, they decided to 
go ahead. How to bridge this divide without submerging the highly technical work and cross 
class building of SDCEA?    
 
In June 2014, the US petroleum giant ExxonMobil arrived in the South Basin to ‘consult’ 
with the community about hunting for oil and gas off the coast of South Africa, including 
KwaZulu-Natal. It unveiled plans to start a three-year exploration in a massive 50 000km search 
area stretching from Port St. Johns in the Eastern Cape to Richards Bay in the north of KZN, at 
sea water depths of up to 3.6km. The exploration area is about 50km off the coastline and 
extends almost 400km out to sea. I was at the first meeting. ExxonMobil arrived with a massive 
document prepared by the Environmental ResourcesProgramme (ERM), touted on their front 
cover as ‘The world’s leading sustainability consultancy.’  
 
In heated community meetings, they were sent packing. But ExxonMobil can afford to be 
smug. They knew that they simply had to show a genuine commitment to consult: 
 
Postapartheid governance regards societal pluralism and popular participation as assets 
only when they can be harnessed in institutionalised interactions aimed at building 
consensus…The government’s claim to objectivity is embodied in its stated mission to 
ascertain “what works,”  whereas conflicting social forces are allegedly bound by their 
narrow self-interest and ideological royalties….The governmental profession of 
nonideological, solution-oriented approaches facilitates a managerial relationship with 
consumers in opposition to  a political one with citizens (Barchiesi 2011, 72). 
 
ExxonMobil know that they are on a good wicket. President Zuma, in July 2014, spoke at 
the launch of Operation Phakisa Big Fast Results Implementation Methodology in Durban 
abouthowSouth Africa’s Oceans 
 
…has a potential to contribute between eight hundred and one million direct jobs….The 
workstream on Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration takes forward issues that government 
has previously tackled.Recent developments have included…the establishment of 
Petroleum Agency SA, and the introduction of enabling legislation such as the Minerals 
and Petroleum Resources Development Act, Royalties Act and schedule 10 of the Income 
Tax Act.These developments were a major step forward and contributed to increasing 
South Africa’s attractiveness as an investment destination for international oil and gas 
companies.The aspiration of this workstream are to further enhance the enabling 
environment for exploration of oil and gas wells, resulting in an increased number of 
exploration wells drilled, while simultaneously maximising the value captured for South 
Africa (Zuma2014).  
 
The government, as the pronouncements of President Zuma and Minister Gigaba 
indicate,remains obsessed with driving an economy that always requires one more mega-project, 
on more mega-event to facilitate the Rostowian take-off into the flight-path of the Northern 
economies: 
 
He’d ransack heaven for its brightest star 
And earth for every last delight that’s to be found; 
Nor all that’s near nor all that’s far 
Can satisfy a heart so restless and profound(Faust304–7). 
 
The Port is touted by government as the solution to the poverty and degradation that is 
the lives of so many in the South Basin. To protest is to go against the national interest: “A 
thornin the eyes, a thorn in the soles of the feet” (11161). The people must be expelled because 
development is for the people. The plans can brook no dissent as the set piece participation 
process gets ticked off by the consultants. There is no time for morality and sentiment.   
 
Meanwhile, to live in the South Basin is to be on a constant war footing, trying to build 
resistance on a terrain slippery with developmentalism, where the old obstacles of race division 
and job hunger still loom large. But it is here too that activists have fought against de-regulation, 
climate change and inequality. In the present context, organizations like SDCEA are highlighting 
how the construction of mega-projects and the devastation of the environment are combined and 
indivisible, seeking to edge from a ‘politics of the environment’ to a ‘politicizing the 
environment’(Swyngedouw 2011). 
 
Worryingly, Bobby Peek has recently shown how the gains made through the democratic 
transition in the broad sphere of the environment and climate change have been progressively 
rolled back. The local eThekwini Municipality which is tasked to monitor air quality in the South 
Basin has witnessed “the dismantling of the...pollution monitoring and enforcement capacity” 
(Peek 2014, 24). Alongside this, while  
 
Local and provincial governments remain without capacity, capacity in the national 
department is allowed to decay and there is no visible effort to build capacity at any level. 
The corporates, such as Shell and BP, claim confidentiality for information and pollution 
and have refused access to their Atmospheric Emission Licenses. They clearly intend to 
restore a regime of purposeful ignorance where information is not available or not 
produced in the first place. What is not measured cannot end in liability...The future looks 
bleak (Peek 2014, 25-26). 
  
The plans for the dug-out port have created uncertainty and exacerbated people’s sense of 
precariousness. There has been a profusion of protests, pamphlets and petitions. But the machine 
grinds on. The sea must be captured and controlled, for it’s a national treasure the government 
says. As we chase after the West, a game where there are no limits to growth, one thinks of the 
blind man who mistakes lemurs digging his grave for the sound of spades hurrying development: 
“The traces of my days on earth / will survive into eternity!” (11583)  and Mephisto’s response:  
 
All of your kind are doomed already; – 
the elements have sworn to help us; 
the end will be annihilation (11548–50). 
 
With the proposed Infrastructure Development Bill, the government wants to speed up 
approvals for mines, oil pipelines, refineries, ports and airports.The struggle in the South Basin is 
to slow down time, to control time, instead of surrendering to it. Its’ success depends on the 
ability of people to forge coalitions of resistance that cut across class and race, place and space to 
both expose the flawed thinking behind the dug-out port and the “slow violence”, to borrow Rob 
Nixon’s phrase, that is everyday eating away at people’s lives (2011). It is worth remembering 
that “the risk of contracting cancer in south Durban is 250 times the norm” and that the local 
primary school has some of the highest asthma rates in the world (Euripidou 2014, 44). 
 
In this context,President Jacob Zuma’s assertion that the ANC will rule till Jesus comes, 
must be remembered. Will that be the time that Faust’s bargain with the devil will come to pass? 
And in the meantime, must Faust be allowed to get on with his work?  
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iPeople in the South Basin of Durban share space with a major industrial zone (Mobeni, Jacobs 
and Prospecton), oil refineries (Engen, owned by Malaysian Petronas, and SAPREF, a joint 
venture of Shell South Africa and British Petroleum South Africa) and a huge pulp and paper 
mill, Mondi Paper. It takes in the residential areas of Bluff, Clairwood, Isipingo, Lamontville, 
Merebank and Wentworth. 
 
